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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE ST A T'E OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal
Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-YS.-

BOUNDARY SPRINGS WATER
USERS ASSOCIATION, a Corporation, JOSEPH M. TRACY,
State Engineer of the State of Utah,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case
No. 8058

Brief of Respondents
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Boundary Springs Water Users Association is
a non-profit corporation organized by the owners of
water rights in :Mill Creek Canyon in the southeast part
of Salt Lake County. The water rights are not in controversy. They were adjudicated in the case of Martha
Young, administratrix, vs. William Gordon, Executor of
the Estate of Daniel Lund, deceased, et al., in what is
1
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known aH tlw Morse Decree, signed by Judge Morse on
t ltt> 1~t day of August, 1913. If any of the rights so adjudil':dt·d ltH\'P hl'Pll lost by abandonment and acquired by
ad\'l·r~(· ll~P, 1-nwh i~HlieH are not before the court in this
t'HHl'.

By tlw :\I or~;e Dl·(·ree, Exhibit 2, the right to the use

of t lw quaut it y of water decreed to various individuals
was dt>Hignated as house use streams, and included in
tlu· lh·<·n·t·, there was listed the ditches and individuals
entitled to that special use of the water. (Exhibit 2,
beginning page 2.) The appropriation of the water by
beneficial use was begun by dipping from the creek or
ditches taken out of the stream. That was the practice
until the controversy out of which this litigation arose.
l\Iill Cn.>l'k Canyon is for the most part in the United
States Forest Preserve and the Government has provided
conveniences for recreation from one end of the canyon
to the other. The stream runs in an open channel and
is contaminated from various sources to the extent that
the water is wholly unfit for culinary uses. It, therefore,
became necessary for the owners of the water to provide
water free from contamination.
At about one-half mile from the mouth of the canyon
arises springs known as the Boundary Springs, which
flow 3 or 4 second feet of water, free from contamination
at the point where they arise. The owners of house
streams decreed by the Morse Decree thought to provide
sufficient of the pure water to meet their requirements
2
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and accordingly, a large number of them organized the
Boundary Springs \Ynter u~wrs Assoeintion, and by the
. Artieles of Ineorporation they subscribed, transferred
to the corporation the full and complete right to divert
the water from the springs into a pipeline and to convPy
it through the pipeline to a point of distribution among
the owners for enlinary, stock ·watering, lawn sprinkling
and other domestic purposes. (Ex. 3, 4, 3, 6, 7 and 8.)
Pursuant to the arrangement, they caused Application X o. 70 to be filed in the Office of the State Engineer
for the transfer of the water decreed to them, to the
lower water users or water users not joining in the association and the withdrawal from the Boundary Springs
of an equal amount of uncontaminated water to be conveyed to them as stated. In the part of the application,
under the heading ''Explanatory,'' their purpose was
stated as follows :
It is the purpose of the applicant, a non-profit
corporation, to divert the waters of Boundary
Springs to the extent of two cubic feet per second,
which water has heretofore commingled with
waters of ~fill Creek Stream as referred to in the
Morse decree, and to convey it as indicated
through a pipeline to a point approximately 1,000
feet East of the West quarter corner of Section
36, T. 1 W., R. 1 E., S. L. B. & M. and there divide
among the owners for culinary purposes and in
lieu of \Yater so diverted to exchange for continuous flow in Mill Creek stream a quantity equal
to water so diverted, and which has heretofore
been conveyed through the open ditches named in
paragraph 11.

3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Paragraph 11 is a rider added to the application and
cleHi~uatPH the ditches referred to in the Morse Decree
ns the Ht illman-Russell Ditch, the Skidmore-Osguthorpe
Ditt-b, tlH· Chamberlain Ditch and the Stillman-Hussey
l>itt·h. (Exhibit 1.)
At a pre-trial hearing, there was a discussion as

to the issues in the case which resulted in the following
stntement:
~lit HOLMGREN: ... The chief proposition
is that we have acquired this as a standby water
right for the culinary use. Now, our chief objection is that the water of Boundary Springs has
been discovered to be practically pure, free from
contamination, whereas the creek flow becomes
contaminated. (R. 24)

And further :
I think, assuming that we have succeeded to a
culinary right, then the question is, has the one
water user, where there are several users in the
creek, has he a right to go up and take the pure
water out of the spring and leave the contaminated water to the other regardless of the degree
of contamination? Any degree, slight or great.
(R. 27)
THE COURT: "\Vell, that's another way of
saying to the court that the granting of this application possibly will interfere with the vested
rights.
MR. HOLMGREN: I think we can demonstrate that there is a difference in contamination
in the Boundary Springs, and that's the reason
these people want it.
4
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MR. HOLl\1:GREN: I can make a statement
that I think would obviate any testimony at all:
that there is a difference in the bacterial couni
and that the taking of this pure water fl'om the
spring tends to increase the bacterial count that
is deliYered down, and the water that is delivered
down would be to us and anybody else who used
that ·water. (R. :27)
On the 6th day of September, 1928, Salt Lake City
entered into a contract with the White Ditch Irrigation
Company for exchange of water and on other dates,
entered into other agreements, (Exhibits 22, 23 and 24)
for the exchange of water with the East Mill Creek
Water Company and Lower Mill Creek Irrigation Company and without making application for change of place
of use, point of diversion or nature of use to the State
Engineer's office (as required by Sec. 73-3-3) proceeded
to deliver other zcater to the ditches from which the city
was to take water, delivered culinary water to the stockholders of the corporation with whom the exchanges
were made and also irrigation water from Utah Lake,
and in turn, withdrew water from Mill Creek proper
including the Boundary Springs and used it at times
prior to 1939. The city has not used any of the water
from :Mill Creek directly since that date and has never
at any time made application with the State Engineer
to divert the waters of Boundary Springs or to take the
Mill Creek water directly into the Salt Lake City water
lines.
In harmony with the issues stated on the pre-trial,
evidence was offered and received showing the bacterial

5
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t·ount al•ove und below the Boundary Springs (See Exhil,its 30 and :n). No reliable conclusions can be drawn
from the e\·id<·IH't> so offered, and there was no claim
mad<· for 11H· present, at least, that Salt Lake City was or
t'<lll Le lli'Cjudi<·ed from the granting of the application
or hy the Dl·<·n·e of the court entered herein.
Complaillt is made, however, that the Application
~o. 70 was made upon tlw wrong form; that it should

lm \'e bt•t•Il made upon an application for change of point
of di\'ersion awl not upon an application for the exchange
of watl·r. For the purpose of disclosing the differences
in the two forms of application, there was received in
evidence Exhibit D. Substantially the same information
is called for in each application, and at the end, the
<lpplieation calls for an explanatory statement. There
is thus raised a highly technical question as to whether
the release to the water users below the Boundary
Springs and the intake at defendant's pipeline, of an
amount of ·water equal in quantity to the amount taken
out of Boundary Springs, is an exchange of water.
\Vhile the Boundary Springs are tributaries of Mill
Creek, the flow is not a part of Mill Creek until they
reach the channel. Therefore, through the works named
in the application, the users were taking the flow above
Boundary Springs and the flow of Boundary Springs.
After the granting of the application, they were taking
no part of the flow of Mill Creek above or below Boundary Springs but are taking the water directly from
the Boundary Springs, a tributary, before it in fact be6
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comes a part of ~[ill Cn)l'k. \Yt:~, at this point, enll the
court's attention to the fad that from the beginning, as
disclosed in the testimony of :Marvin Taylor, the State
Engineer directed the form to be used for the purposes
intended and not only proYided the exchange form of
application, but as indicated, changed the application,
in form at least, that was filed. (R. 64-65.)
There was introduced in evidence the rules and regulations of the office of the State Engineer. (Exhibit 18)
Paragraph 2, page 1, provides:
2. ~\.n application received upon an improper
or obsolete form, filled out in substantial compliance with the law and accompanied by the proper
fee, will be received. However, the applicant shall,
upon request of the state engineer, replace it with
an application on the proper form and make other
necessary corrections within sixty days from the
date of its transmittal to the applicant, otherwise
the date of priority of the application will be
brought down to the date when the application is
filed in the proper form.
We turn to a discussion of the points raised by
appellant.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THERE WAS PROOF OF AVAILABILITY OF
WATER OF LIKE QUALITY AND QUANTITY FOR
THE PURPOSE USED AND THE GRANTING OF
APPLICATION NO. 70 BY THE STATE ENGINEER
WAS PROPER.

7
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POINT II
l'l' \\' AH NOT ERROR FOR THE COURT TO AF~,lHM 'l'HE DEClHION OF THE STATE ENGINEER

1!\ APPHOVlNG APPLICA'rlON NO. 70 AND ALL
PAR'l'IJi~H CO~CJi~lU\ED HAD PROPER NOTICE
0~, THE HALD APPLIUATION.
POI~T

III

'I' HE RIG I I 'rS OF 'l'HE APPLICANT WERE DESIGNATED IN THE ~IORSE DECREE AS "HOUSE
VHE STREAl\IS" \VHICH, LIKE THE APPLICATIOX IXl'LUDES STOCKWATERING AND IRRIUATIOX.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECREEI~G THAT THE APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO
THE APPROVAL OF HIS APPLICATION AND TO
A CERTIFICATE FROl\I THE STATE ENGINEER
GRANTING A PERl\fANENT RIGHT TO DIVERT
UP TO 1.5675 SECOND FEET OF WATER FROM
BOUNDARY SPRINGS PURSUANT TO APPLICATION NO. 70 UPON PROPER PROOF OF BENEFICIAL USE.
POINT V
THE DIVERTING OF WATER FROM BOUNDARY
SPRINGS UNDER APPLICATION NO. 70 DOES
NOT IMPROPERLY MODIFY OR CHANGE THE
TERMS OF THE MORSE DECREE.
8
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POINT Yl
THE APPROY AL OF ..:\ PPLICATION NO. 70,
vVHETHER DEEl\IED AN EXCHANGE OF WATER
OR ~-\. CH~-\.XGE OF "~.ATER OR A CHANGE OF
POIXT OF DIYERSIOX, DOES NOT INVADE THE
RIGHTS OF THE APPELLANT OR OF ANY OTHER
0\YXERS OF RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATERS
OF ~IILL CREEK .
.ARGUJ\[E~T

POINT I
THERE \Y~-\.S PROOF OF AVAILABILITY OF
WATER OF LIKE QUALITY AND QUANTITY FOR
THE PURPOSE USED AND THE GRANTING OF
APPLICATIOX XO. 70 BY THE STATE ENGINEER
\Y.AS PROPER.
Any person entitled to the use of water has a right
to change the manner of using it or to exchange it for
other water if the proposed change will not interfere
with vested rights. Kinney on Water Rights, p. 1538.
Even if vested rights will be interferred with, the owner
of the water right is entitled to make the change if the
order of approval can be made with conditions which
will protect other vested rights. Very early in the development of the law of appropriation attempts were
made to limit the right to use water to its initial mode
of enjoyment. However, the courts and legislatures of
practically all of the Western states have held that the
9
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watt·r right i~ independent of the mode of enjoyment,
atu1 tltat dmnges may be made in the place of use, the
poiut of di\'t'rHiou, or the mode of enjoyment. This
gt•ttt·ral r;tatt·mPut is supported by all the general texts.
~l't' "\\'il'l \Vatt·r HigiltH of the Western States," Vol. 1,
pagc.> :,~!I; ·'Hutchins Selected Problems in the Law of
\\'at•·r Hi~.dtts in the West," page 378; "Kinney on Irri~a t iou mal \Vater Rights," Vol. 2, page 1499.

In etah the right to make a change in the mode of
t•njoyment of water has been a rather frequent subject
of litigation, and it may be considered as settled law that
the right to make the change is granted by statute and
will oHly be denied where the change will injure the
vested rights of others, and where the order approving
the change cannot be so conditioned as to protect those
rights. See S'igurd City r. State, 105 Utah 278, 142 P.
2d 134; Tanner~·. Humphries, 87 Utah 164, 148 P. 2d 484.
In Tanner v. Humphries, supra, the court had before
it a change application and an exchange. The plaintiff
applicant was non-suited when he rested. He appealed
to the Supreme Court. The court said:
If the point of diversion may be changed and
the exchange made as applied for by the plaintiff
without affecting any vested right of the power
company, or if a decree can be made containing
such conditions as will safeguard the rights of
the power company and at the same time permit
of the delivery of water for municipal purposes,
plaintiff is entitled to have her application
granted.
10
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The court then indicated that the burden of proying- that
the exchange could be made \Vas on the plaintiff, but
that:

* * * it may be that the plaintiff should put in
general proof that the change will not injure or
disturb Yested rights, but if so, it is rather in
homage to the general rule that he is required to
offer proof in support of all of his allegations,
because as a practical matter those who protest
·will most likely be better situated to know wherein
they will be injured than will the plaintiff.
Thus, applicant has a right to make the change unless
it will interfere with the City's vested rights, and the
City had the general responsibility of demonstrating to
the Court the manner in which its rights will be impaired.
It should also be noted that Section 73-3-20, U.C.A.

1953, under which Application No. 70 was filed, provides
that exchanges may be granted ''but in so doing the
original water * * * must not be deteriorated in quality
or diminished in quantity for the purpose used.'' It is
respondents' contention that the appellant has made no
showing to bring it within that part of the statute as
the evidence is conclusive that the present use of the
water of ~!ill Creek is exclusively for irrigation.
The control over the water was effectually assigned
to the Boundary Springs Water Users Association by
the Articles of Incorporation and by the certificates of
stock received in evidence as exhibit 5 and which provided:
11
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1'he iHHtuHwe and acceptance of this certificate
ohall up(•rate aH a transfer to the Boundary
Springs Watt-r Users Association of the right to
apply to the ~tate Engineer of the State of Utah
fur a pPrmit to change the point of diversion and
ww of water owned by the holder of this certificate
(·qual to .01 second feet of water for each share of
Ht(wk <·\·id<•JH·ed by the certificate and the transfer
of sueh wat('r Hhall be and remain irrevocable so
long as this certificate is outstanding or until it
is cancelled by order of the Board of Directors
of the Association.
'J:'he essence of appellant's Point I is that the appellant failed to show that it (the corporation) had water
available to put into Mill Creek steam in exchange for
the water it proposed to take at Boundary Springs. The
water of ~fill Creek is decreed by the Morse Decree,
which was introduced in evidence. An abstract chart
showing the conveyance from the decreed owner to the
present owner was also admitted in evidence by stipulation to show the various chains of title. The Morse
Decree, plus the abstract chart and the list of stockholders, show that the stockholders of Boundary Springs
are the owners of decreed water rights in Mill Creek. In
addition to the power granted to Boundary Springs by
the stockholders, as set forth in the stock certificate, the
stockholders who were present testified that they were
familiar with the application filed by Boundary Springs,
that it was authorized on their behalf to make the application, and that they affirmed and ratified its action. It
was stipulated that each other stockholder of Boundary
Springs would testify to the same effect as to his decreed

12
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water if he were called as a ~witlwss. \V P, then•t'on•, rPspectfully submit that Boundary Springs was authorized
on behalf of the decreed owners of water to apply for
the change described in the application. It was not contradicted that these decreed owners who associated
themselves together by forming a mutual non-profit
water corporation, proposed to leaYe the water accruing
under their decreed rights in l\Iill Creek to ~mpply the
lower users and to take in exchange therefor a like quantity of water from Boundary Springs.
There is, of course, nothing unusual in the law of
water rights for decreed owners to retain the ownership
of the water rights themselves while transferring the
right to manage, distribute and control to a mutual water
company. This practice has been uniformly recognized
by the decisions of this court. See, for example, Genola
Tozcn v. Santaquin City, 96 Utah 88, 80 P. 2d 930, and
East River Bottom v. Boyce, 102 Utah 149, 128 P. 2d 277.
The objection raised by the City in this regard is
purely technical. Technical objections are not looked
upon by the courts with favor unless they are timely
raised. The City filed a written protest, (see Ex. 14)
and appeared before the State Engineer at a hearing to
consider the approval or rejection of the application.
The City failed to raise any objection at that time to the
fact that the application was made by the corporation,
rather than by the individual decreed owners. If there
were any technical deficiency in this regard (which we
deny), it could certainly have been cured at that point.
13
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~~urtlwr, this point is not raised by plaintiff's complaint,
uor was it raised at the pre-trial. We submit that the
Htipulatioll to the effect that each decreed owner would
h•Ht i l'y tlta t lll' authorized the corporation to make this
appli(·atio11, plus the authorization granted by the articles
nud n•(·ited iu the stock <·ertificates, are adequate toremovt> thiH mutter from doubt.

POINT II

rr

\VA~ NOT ERROR FOR THE COURT TO AFFIRM THE DECISION OF THE STATE ENGINEER
IN APPHOVIXG APPLICATION NO. 70 AND ALL
PARTIES CO?\CERNED HAD PROPER NOTICE
OF THE SAID APPLICATION.

This contention is extremely technical and after full
consideration of the question as to whether the exchange
form or the application for change of point of diversion
form would be the correct form to use, we are convinced
that the exchange form was as held by the State Engineer, the correct form. The purpose was to release water
from the right of diversion from the main channel of
Mill Creek and in turn, to take the same quantity of
water from the Boundary Springs before the flow from
the Springs became a part of Mill Creek proper. As
quoted in the brief for the appellants, the application was
made upon blanks furnished by the State Engineer who
made minor corrections. The purpose throughout was
made perfectly clear and that is all that the law contemplates.

14
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It is contended that the notiel', Exhibit 16, was insufficient. The notice names the rights decreed in the
Morse Decree and specifies that it is the purpose to divert
the water from Boundary Springs and convey it through
a pipeline for domestic and stock watering purposes and
for incidental irrigation of la,vns and shrubs and that
·water theretofore diverted would remain in the natural
channel of _jiill Creek to satisfy other rights diverting
from Mill Creek. There is no merit whatsoever in Point
:2, for if there was error in using the wrong form, it was
wai\ed by the State Engineer and by the plaintiff.
The State Engineer, under various sections of Title
73, is empowered to furnish the blanks upon which the
various applications are to be made. By the same
statutes, applicants are directed to use the blanks furnished by the State Engineer; see, for example, Sections
73-3-2, 73-3-3 and 73-5-13. The statute dealing with exchanges, (73-3-20) merely requires the application to be
in writing.
Also, by express statute (73-2-1) the State Engineer
has been granted power ''to make and publish such rules
and regulations as may be necessary from time to time
fully to carry out the duties of his office.'' The rules
and regulations of the State Engineer were introduced
in evidence as Exhibit 18. Rule 8 provides that applications shall be made only upon the printed forms furnished by the State Engineer. Thirteen separate types
of application blanks are thereafter enumerated. Paragraph 2, page 2 then provides :

15
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Au application received upon an improper or

ol~sol('tt~ form, filled out in substantial compliance
w~th the law,, and accompanied by the proper fee,
w1ll he recmved. However, the applicant shall

upon n·quest of the State Engineer replace it with
au appli<·ation on a proper form.

N('it IH·r tlu· rules nor the statutes set forth any parti('ular crit•·ria for determining which of the thirteen
hlauks should be used for a particular purpose. The
ehange and exchange application forms were introduced
in t•\·idence at the trial to show the similarity of the
information requested. Reference to the photographs
introduced in evidenee shows that Boundary Springs
issue from the bank of the stream, but the water can be
successfully captured before it reaches the stream by
a concrete wall and drain field, located between the
springs and the creek. Whether Boundary Springs and
l\Iill Creek are two separate and distinct sources of water,
so that they should be covered by an exchange application, might be debatable. The State Engineer directed
that the exchange blank be used. He had the authority
to so require under both the statutes and his rules and
regulations. The applicant complied with the State
Engineer's instructions in this regard. (R. 64-65.)
This is another technical matter raised by the City
for the first time during the trial. It was not raised in
the written protest filed with the State Engineer, nor at
the hearing before the State Engineer, nor in the complaint, nor at the pre-trial. Nor has the City alleged,
nor proved how it claims to have been prejudiced by the
16
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ust' of one blank rather than the other. The t~ity is not

in the position of haYing been mislead by the notice into
failing to prott>st or participate in the proceedings. It
did appear in eYery stage of the proceedings. It fully
knew at all times what was proposed.
The City has not shown, nor can it show, any prejudice to it, and it is respectfully submitted that the City
is not entitled to prevail on Point II.
POINT III
THE RIGHTS OF THE APPLICANT WERE DESIGXATED IN THE MORSE DECREE AS "HOUSE
USE STREA~IS'' WHICH, LIKE THE APPLICATION INCLUDES STOCKWATERING AND IRRIGATION.
The use of the water decreed under the Morse Decree
and the use of the water to be made through the pipeline
from Boundary Springs, as stated in Application No. 70,
under "Explanatory" and paragraph 12, was for domestic and stock watering purposes. Certainly domestic
use in this country would include lawn sprinkling and
minor irrigation of garden vegetables, if any, provided
an excessive amount of water is not used.
Apparently the City's contention is that because the
''house use stream'' given by the Morse Decree included
the use of the water for irrigation purposes, while the
application filed merely specified the use as for "domestic
and stock watering purposes,'' the application could not

17
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hl· appro\'l'd. We lwlieve that the application sufficiently
rl'fll't't:-; that it is the intention to transfer these "house
HHt• streams'' from Mill Creek to Boundary Springs to
tlw full l•xtent of the 1.5675 e.f.s., decreed rights; and
that Uw water is to be used for household purposes.
'l'lw authorities support the concept that "domestic
u~t·" it; sy11ouymous with "household use" and includes
l'uliuary, lawu and garden watering and livestock watering. ln Bountiful City v. DeLuca, 77 Utah 107, 292 P.
194, at page 119 of the Utah Reports, the Utah Court
was considering the meaning of a statute and indicated
that the term ''use for domestic purposes" includes
watering livestock. In "Gould on Waters," Section 205,
page 397, Third Ed., it is stated that:
The term ''domestic purposes'' extends to culinary and household purposes, to the watering of
a garden, and to the cleaning and washing, feeding and supplying the ordinary quantity of cattle.
It would appear to extend also to brewing, and
the washing of carriages, but it does not include
such manufacturing uses as grinding, washing
and cooling of rubber.
See also, "Wiel, \Yater Rights in the Western
States," page 798, footnote 22, and "Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights,'' Vol. 2, page 1195.
Here again the City raises a highly technical point,
which was not presented in its protest to the State Engineer, nor at the hearing before the State Engineer, nor
in its complaint, nor at the pre-trial, nor do we remember
the matter having been argued at all before the trial
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court. Xor does the City 11ow ~how the manner in which
it could be prejudiced in this regard. ThP q un 11 tit y of
watPr which the applicant seeks to l)xehange emhnH'('H
all of the water decreed to its stockholders by i ht' l\1 onH~
Decree. It totals 1.5673 e.f.s. The exact manner in which
they intend to take and use the water is specified, and is
characterized ns for "domestic and stock watering purposes.·~ The term ''domestic uses'' is not defined in the
application, but it is used as it has been uniformly used
in the administration of water rights in this state to
govern all normal and ordinary household uses. It was
in this sense that the streams decreed to the applicant's
stockholders were characterized by the Morse Decree
as ''house use'' streams, for in Finding 6, the court
referred to a "continuous stream for culinary, stock
watering, domestic and irrigation purposes, being
streams commonly known as house use streams.'' The
application is adequate in this regard, and the court
should not in any event look with favor upon technical
arguments such as this raised for the first time on appeal.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECREEING THAT THE APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO
THE APPROVAL OF HIS APPLICATION AND TO
A CERTIFICATE FROM THE STATE ENGINEER
GRANTING A PERMANENT RIGHT TO DIVERT
UP TO 1.5675 SECOND FEET OF WATER FROM
BOUNDARY SPRINGS PURSUANT TO APPLICA-

19
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TION NO. 70 UPON PROPER PROOF OF BENE~~H 'IAL USE.
'rhe deeree of the court, as drafted and submitted,
nppro\'Pd and <'oufirmed the issuance of Permit No. 70,
and it dPen•ed the right to divert and use up to 1.5675
~-'l'l~OIHl fpet of water of Boundary Springs pursuant to
Appli('ation No. 70. Protective provisions are inserted
in tltP dl·c·rpe to the effect that the decreed water would
be under the supervision and control of the court commi~:-;ioner as provided in the Morse Decree, and it was
without prejudice to the right of any claimant to the
water of Mill Creek to initiate and prosecute a plenary
suit or suits for the adjudication of the claims of all
water users of :\I ill Creek, whether claiming under the
Morse Decree or otherwise. The court concludes that
such issues are not before the court and then the court
directs the State Engineer to issue a certificate showing
authority to make a change, the certificate to contain a
provision to the effect that the granting of the application is without prejudice to vested interest.
The court, of course, without express language,
contemplated that proof of the diversion and beneficial
use of the water would be made as required by the
statute. In other words, we read into the decree the
statutory provisions respecting the change of water
which are fundamental to all water rights. That is the
water must be diverted and beneficially used and proof
must be submitted before the right to the use is perfected
and a certificate issued.
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'--: _-

POI.Nrr V
THE DIYERTING OF 'YATER FROM BOUNDARY
SPRIXGS lTXDER APPLICATION NO. 70 DOES
N"OT l~IPROPERLY ~IODIB--,Y OR CHANGE THE
TER~IS OF THE :MORSE DECREE.
Every change in the point of diversion or exchange
of water to a certain extent modifies pre-existing rights.
TI.1e rights modified, however, are not with respect to
the ownership of the water but only as to the change of
point of dhTersion, change of place of use or exchange
of use. Our statutes provide for such changes and every
decree that is ever entered has been subject to such
subsequent changes. It does not follow, however, that
such changes are in any respect prejudicial to other
water users.
The City seems to be asserting that once water has
been decreed no change application can thereafter be
filed, which would to any extent modify the decree. No
authority is cited for the proposition, and of course none
could be. ~lost of the water rights in the state are decreed, and change applications are constantly filed and
approved. In fact, the statutes contemplate that change
applications can only be filed on perfected water rights.
Section 73-3-3 limits the making of changes to persons
"entitled" to the use of water. Changes by individuals
who have not yet perfected their rights are governed
by Section 73-3-6. It would serve no useful purposes to
cite the numerous cases in which this court has affirmed
the approval of change applications where the water
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ri~ltts iuvolvPd had already been covered by court deOu" such example, however, is Tarvner v. Humpht·it·s, supra, 87 Utah 164.

('l'l'L'H.

'l'he only otlwr argument made by the City under
Poiut V iH that if the water decreed to each particular
dit<"h iH dimiuiHhed, by placing part of it in a pipeline,
tlw remaiuiug water must stand more loss from seepage
:ttul p\·a pora t iotJ. TIH~n~ is no evidence that there would
he a11y loss. It is not true that all ditches lose water.
Soml· ditehes are eoHstructed through areas where the
ground water is high and the ditches collect water and
to a certain extent act as drains. There are also ditches
through areas where the ground is so compacted that it
is almost impervious to water. Without any evidence
to the effect that the water rights remaining in the ditches
will be adversely affected, the City is "literally grasping
at straws." Further, the city is not the owner of the
ditches, or of the right to use water through them. If
the City ev·er exercises the rights which it claims under
its exchange applications, the flow of Mill Creek will be
placed in a pipeline and taken to Salt Lake City. There
is no complaint from any individual who owns any
interest in any of these ditches, and the City is not in a
position to complain on behalf of the ditch owners.
POINT VI
THE APPROVAL OF APPLICATION NO. 70,
WHETHER DEEMED AN EXCHANGE OF WATER
OR A CHANGE OF WATER OR A CHANGE OF
22
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POIXT OF DIYER8IOX, DOES NOT INVADE TIIM
RIGHTS OF THE APPELLANT OR OF .ANY OTI-IER
(Y\YXEHS OF RIUHTS TO THE USE OF WATERS
OF _JIILL CREEK.

~·- ~-

.

.:._-~

Point YI is the only point under whirh the City has
attempted to show that the approval of this application
will in any way prejudice it. It asserts that the City
has a ,-ested right to have the pure ·water of Boundary
Springs continue to flow into and commingle with the
polluted water of ~Iill Creek, so as to some extent
diminish the degree of pollution. Mill Creek is so polluted that the water from it is not fit for human consumption. The City has the power to control the watershed
of _JJill Creek and stop the sources of pollution. See
Section 10-8-15. But it has not seen fit to do so.
~Iill

Creek Canyon is jammed throughout the summer. There is probably no canyon in the state which is
more heavily used for recreational purposes. Numerous
picnicing areas and recreational facilities are established
and maintained in the Canyon, and the necessary result
of this recreational use is pollution of the water supply.
(R. 101.)
When the :Morse Decree was entered nearly 40 years
ago, the people who settled in the mouth of Mill Creek
Canyon appropriated the water for their farms and for
household uses, and the water was safe to drink. The
court recognized this use and decreed to these settlers
house use streams. As the development of the canyon
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for recreational purposes increased, the water become
more und more contaminated and became so bad in 1939
thnt tIt(' ( ~ity was required to abandon it, because even
wit It ehlorination the water could not be made safe.
(H. !1!1, 100.)

Tit(' culinary users which made the exchange with
tltt· ( ~ity, Ita\'(' since the date of the exchange in 1923,
hl'l'll supplied and are now being supplied with culinary
watl•r by the City, and the City until 1939 took Mill
Creek for l'ity use. This involved a change in point of
diversion. It also involved a change in place of use. We
contend it also involved a change in the purpose or
manner of use. The City (although it wants to be extremely technical with us) made this change without
attempting to comply with any of the requirements of
the Ftah statutes. It now comes in and asserts that it
is the owner of a "'rested" right to use Mill Creek for
culinary use and to have Boundary Springs commingle
with the polluted water of Mill Creek.
The City states in its brief that it intends to install
a filtration plant. At times l\Iill Creek is so polluted
that it cannot be brought up to safe standards, even
with filtration. This does not frequently happen, and
probably with even a token effort by the City to
control the watersheds the water could be made fit for
human consumption with filtration and complete treatment. It is significant, however, to note that the City
did not attempt to show that the water could be rendered
24
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fit for human use if Boundary Springs is left to commingle with .Mill Creek, but that the water eannot be
rendered fit for human use if Boundary Springs is taken
out. Xor did the City attempt to show that the cost of
treatment would be increased if Boundary Springs is
taken out. The eYidence, "·ithout conflict, shows that
with Boundary Springs left in or with Boundary Springs
taken out, the waters of :Mill Creek cannot be used for
domestic use with simple chlorination. Certainly the
Yery small quantity of water issuing from Boundary
Springs, as against the very large quantity of water
flowing in ~Iill Creek, is not going to dilute the pollution
to the extent of making any substantial difference to
the City if it decides it wants to treat the water.
The City states on page 27 of its brief that "on the
a rerage" the water is more pure below Boundary
Springs than above it. Reference to the exhibits will
show, however, that on numerous occasions the water
immediately below Boundary Springs is more polluted
than the water immediately above. The sources of pollution are so close to the stream that even after Boundary
Springs are released into Mill Creek and the pollution
is diluted at the point of commingling, within 100 feet
below the point of commingling, the water is worse than
it was above Boundary Springs. The evidence, therefore,
totally fails to show that the City receives any benefit
whatsoever from having Boundary Springs commingle
with Mill Creek and from having all the water issuing
from the canyon polluted.
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A more striking example of a "dog in the manger"
attitude would be hard to find. The City says, "We admit that Mill Creek is so polluted that we had to abandon
it H llHL', bt-L· a use simple chlorination would not render it
~ar,.. \V e would, nevertheless, like the people who reside
on tilL· land at mouth of Mill Creek Canyon to use this
polluted water, bt~eause at some future date the City
might waut to use the water for culinary purposes."
\\'lwu thi~ future date arrives, if it ever does, the City
admits that the waters of .\Iill Creek must be filtered
and completely treated. The City does not contend that
tl1is treatment and filtration would be more expensive,
more troublesome, or in any way detrimental to the City,
because of the fact that Boundary Springs is not commingling with ~!ill Creek. In fact, every natural implication would be and the exhibits show that the small
quantity of water in Boundary Springs commingling with
the large quantity of water in Mill Creek in a canyon
where the source of pollution is very near the stream,
could not have and does not have any material effect on
the amount of stream pollution. The Supreme Court in
Tauuer v. Humphries, supra, has laid down the rule that
the person claiming that his rights will be prejudiced
should show in particular how they will be prejudiced.
This, the City has not done. It just relies on the general
principle that if you put one gallon of pure water with
100 gallons of polluted water, the degree of pollution in
the 101 gallons will be somewhat less. We do not conceive the law to be that the City can prevail simply by
showing that there is an infinitesimal effect on the
stream.
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In '' I~inney on Irrigation and \Vater Rights,'' Vol.
page 1538, it is stated that n change in the manner
of using water should be permitted unless the interference with the rights of others is a ''real s ubsfantial
injury," which seriously affects the rights of others;
that a mere fanciful trifling injury will not prevent the
change. Says Kinney :
~'

I~

..:

'":.."'·-··
--~

Upon the question of an extent of an injury
to the vested rights of others, which must exist
before any change is prevented, we will say here
that it must be of such a nature that it is a real
substantial injury, and seriously affecting the
rights of others. A mere fanciful or trifling injury will not prevent the change.
Kinney also agrees with the general statement from
Tanner c. Humphries, that the burden rests upon the
person claiming injury. On page 538 he states:

---

A water right, being a property right of the
highest order, its owner may do what he wishes
with his own, including the making of such changes
as he sees fit to make, provided that he does not
materially injure the rights of others in making
them. * * * The restriction to the right to make
the change that others must not be injured by the
change, is a matter of defense; and, therefore,
the burden of proof showing that injuries have
been done to the rights of others is upon the one
seeking damage for injuries actually committed
or seeking an injunction. * * * The injury to the
rights of others must be proven, as is any other
fact, by the party alleging the injury.
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The other text writers also speak of "material" or
''substantial'' interference with the rights of others. See
''Hutchins Law of Water Rights in theW est,'' page 378.
rrherefore, the fanciful contention of the City that
it gPtH ht•Jlefit from having Boundary Springs become
pollutt•d, so that to some infinitesimal degree the pollution of Mill Creek is diluted, is not a basis for denying
the change. Even with the careful testing of the water
hPlow and above the springs, as shown by Exhibit 30,
31 and 3~, it is difficult to determine any substantial
improvement in the water after Boundary Springs commingles with ~Iill Creek. In fact, on many, many occasions the water is worse below the point of commingling
than it was above the point of commingling. The same
general principle obtains as to fanciful losses in evaporation or seepage, because there is less water in the ditches.
The burden was on Salt Lake City to come forward to
show a substantial interference with its rights, because,
as Ki1mey says, the change should be permitted unless
there is serious substantial interference and that fanciful
and technical injuries will be disregarded.
The plaintiff in this case has instituted and prosecuted a suit that is wholly without equity. It has never
itself made application for change of point of diversion
or exchange of water or for the right to beneficially use
Boundary Springs. The water has flowed continuously
into Mill Creek channel and has become polluted to the
extent that it is wholly unfit for culinary use. Plaintiff's
objection now is based not upon any use or immediate

28
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

·

~. S:-

~~ ·,

-,

--:

intention to nsl' the water itself. HaYing made no application for change of point of diYersiou, or to change
the place of USl\ or to change irrigation water for culinary \Yater, it Sl'eks nothing whatsoever by its complaint.
There is reference to a sta11dby use of the water, but the
City has done nothing that would make the water available no matter how desperate the situation may be among
the residents of the City. There is nothing in the record
to indicate that Salt Lake City ever intends to or could
utilize the water for the reason that contamination is so
great that it would not, without complete treatment, be
made fit for consumption. So far as the record discloses,
_Jiill Creek will run in perpetuity as it has been running
since the beginning of time and yet the City seeks to
prevent the rightful owners of house use streams from
diverting the Boundary Springs into a pipeline and
thereby saving the water from pollution for their own
beneficial uses strictly in accordance with their decreed
rights.
FORFEITURE IS NOT A PROPER ISSUE
We do not believe that the question of whether the
City has forfeited its water rights is a proper issue. It
could not have been decided by the State Engineer. The
issues in this court and in the district court are the same
as they were before the State Engineer. See Eardley v.
Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P. 2d 362. We do not desire to
have this court pass upon that issue. The trial court
at the pre-trial indicated that it was not an issue and
no evidence was introduced thereon by either party. It
29
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may 11l' that if the City ever attempts to assert its rights
iu \1 ill Cn·ek by using it for culinary use, that the
appli,·ant will dPHire to assert this question of forfeiture.
\\' l', 1h'·n·fon·, uo not waut the argument of the City to
}IHHH mmote<i, :-;o that the Supreme Court settles this
i~~~~~· for them by letting them in "through the back
door." It iH twt at all established in the water law of
thi:-; !"tate that a <·ity <·am1ot forfeit its water rights. Sect ion 7::-1-~ <·<'rtainly :-;o intends, and the only case we
ar1· awan· of where the issue was presented and decided
iH .1/t. 0/icd ('t,mdery Assn. r. Salt Lake City, 65 Utah
193, :2:3:1 P. 876, and there the court did hold that Salt
Lake ( 'ity hau forfeited its water right. The contention
that the City must appropriate water beyond its present
needs is adequately taken care of by Section 73-1-4,
which permit:-; the cities to obtain a non-use permit.
That section expressly provides:
Such applications for extension shall be
granted by the State Engineer for periods not
exceeding five years each, upon a showing of
reasonable cause for such non-use. Financial
crisis * * * or the holding of a water right without
use by any municipality, metropolitan water district, or other public agencies to meet the reasonable future requirements of the public, shall constitute reasonable cause for such non-use.
In this case all users of culinary water from Mill
Creek, except the stockholders of the applicant, have
been getting their culinary water since the 1920's from
Salt Lake City. Salt Lake City, without a change application, used the water for culinary purposes in the City
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until 1939, but from 1939 until the datt> of this trial
tlwre ha::-; been no use whnh'Yt>r of the water for enlinary
purposes, except by the stockholders of the applicant.
\Yhether any culinary right could be kept alive by irrigation usages is debatable. There is also considerable
doubt that the City is the owner of any culinary rights,
because it did not file the required applications, and if
anybody did assign any culinary rights to the City under
the exchange agreements, the quantity is exceedingly
small. \Y e, therefore, ask the court not to rule upon this
question of forfeiture, because it was not presented to,
nor passed upon by, the trial court, and the evidence
which would be necessary to an intelligent determination
of the issue is not before the court.
THE ISSrE IS: HAS THE BOUNDARY SPRINGS
\VATER USERS ASSOCL\_TION THE RIGHT TO
A PERjiiT TO WITHDR~\_W PURE CULINARY
WATER FRQji THE BOUNDARY SPRINGS TO
THE EXTEXT OXLY OF ITS STOCKHOLDERS'
HOUSE STREAji RIGHTS BEFORE IT IS POLLUTED BY CQjijiiXGLING WITH MILL CREEK
OR jirST IT STAND BY AND PERMIT THE
WATER, WHICH THEY OWN IN PART AT
LEAST, TO BECO::\IE POLLUTED TO THE EXTENT THAT IT CANNOT BE USED FOR CULI~ARY PURPOSES BY ITS MEMBERS.
The court will bear in mind that the house streams,
as defined in the Morse Decree, mean the water which
the decreed owners had used from time immemorial for
culinary and household purposes directly from the creek
bed and the various ditches through which it was with-
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drawu. ( iollditions have changed until as disclosed by
Uw n•<·ord, the water is now polluted to the extent that
it i~ 11ot useable even by chemical treatment.
Salt Lake City, notwithstanding its claim of ownership of irrigation water, has never applied for a permit
to ('huuge the use or to divert and use Boundary Springs
or Mill <:rt•<·k waters for culinary purposes. Nor has it
upplil'd to change the point of diversion or place of use.
By the pleadings and the record, the question of dividing
of the Boundary Springs water is wholly moot, for no
litigant asks for a division, and of course, there being
no issue, neither the State Engineer nor the district
court could make it. At some future time such an issue
may be presented, and the court may then determine it.
Further, nearly all of the owners of house use streams
are stockholders of the applicant. The total house use
streams (both applicant's and third parties') decreed
by the Morse Decree will seldom, if ever, exceed the
flow of Boundary Springs. If all of the house use stream
owners desired to take their water from Boundary
Springs it probably would be adequate for all. No one
has filed an application to change for that or to change
from irrigation to domestic use. Irrigation users certainly can not complain. If all house use stream owners
did desire to go to Boundary Springs, other questions
may then be presented to the court, such as the right of
the users to share equally in the pure water. If change
applications are filed by the City to convert irrigation
water rights into culinary water rights and to take the
water from the Boundary Springs instead of from the
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l\lill Creek channel, those change applications will be
junior to this one. It may be claimed that Salt Lake City,
by failing to use the water, has lost it by abandonment.
The effect of the prior application of Boundary Springs
"\Yater Users Association may be presented.

.''
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Xone of the questions suggested have been put in
issue in this case and this application should be approved.

.:...:,,

Respectfully submitted,
J.D. SKEEN
EDWARD W. CLYDE
Attorneys for
Boundary Springs
E. R. CALLISTER ·
Attorney General
ROBERT B. PORTER
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for State Engineer
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